A Model-Based Derivative-Free Approach to Black-Box Adversarial
  Examples: BOBYQA by Ughi, Giuseppe et al.
A Model-Based Derivative-Free Approach to Black-Box Adversarial Examples:
BOBYQA
Ughi Giuseppe 1 Abrol Vinayak 1 Tanner Jared 1
Abstract
We demonstrate that model-based derivative free
optimisation algorithms can generate adversar-
ial targeted misclassification of deep networks
using fewer network queries than non-model-
based methods. Specifically, we consider the
black-box setting, and show that the number of
networks queries is less impacted by making
the task more challenging either through reduc-
ing the allowed `∞ perturbation energy or train-
ing the network with defences against adversar-
ial misclassification. We illustrate this by con-
trasting the BOBYQA algorithm (Powell, 2009)
with the state-of-the-art model-free adversarial
targeted misclassification approaches based on ge-
netic (Alzantot et al., 2019), combinatorial (Moon
et al., 2019), and direct-search (Andriushchenko
et al., 2019) algorithms. We observe that for
high `∞ energy perturbations on networks, the
aforementioned simpler model-free methods re-
quire the fewest queries. In contrast, the proposed
BOBYQA based method achieves state-of-the-art
results when the perturbation energy decreases,
or if the network is trained against adversarial
perturbations.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (NNs) achieve state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on a growing number of applications such as acoustic
modelling, image classification, and fake news detection
(Hinton et al., 2012; He et al., 2015; Monti et al., 2019)
to name but a few. Alongside their growing application,
there is a literature on the robustness of deep nets which
shows that it is often possible to generate images with subtle
perturbations, referred to as adversarial examples (Szegedy
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et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015), to the input of a net-
work resulting in its performance being severely degraded;
for example, see (Dalvi et al., 2004; Kurakin et al., 2017;
Sitawarin et al., 2018; Eykholt et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2019)
concerning the use-case of self driving cars.
Methods to generate these adversarial examples are classi-
fied according to two main criteria (Yuan et al., 2019).
Adversarial Specificity establishes what the aim of the ad-
versary is. In non-targeted attacks, the method perturbs
the image in such a way that it is misclassified into any
different category than the original one. While in tar-
geted settings, the adversary specifies a category into
which an image has to be misclassified.
Adversary’s Knowledge defines the amount of informa-
tion available to the adversary. In White-box settings
the adversary has complete knowledge of the net-
work architecture and weights, while in the Black-box
setting the adversary is only able to obtain the pre-
classification outpupt vector for a limited number of
inputs. The White-box setting allows for the use of
gradients of a missclassification objective to efficiently
compute the adversarial example (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Chen et al., 2018),
while the same optimization formulation of the Black-
box setting requires use of a derivative free approach
(Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017; Chen et al.,
2017; Ilyas et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2019).
The generation of black-box targeted adversarial examples
for deep NNs has been extensively studied in a setting ini-
tially proposed by (Chen et al., 2017) where:
• the adversarial example is found by solving an optimi-
sation problem designed to change the original classifi-
cation of a specific input to a specific alternative.
• the perturbation, which causes the network to change
the classification, has entries bounded in magnitude by
a specified infinity norm (maximum entry magnitude).
• the number of queries to the NN needed to generate
the adversarial example should be as small as possible.
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Figure 1: The success rate (SR) of the BOBYQA algo-
rithm to generate a targeted adversarial example compared
to GenAttack (Alzantot et al., 2019), COMBI (Moon et al.,
2019), and SQUARE (Andriushchenko et al., 2019) attacks
as a function of the perturbation energy; specifically for a
network trained on the CIFAR10 dataset without defences
(Norm) and with the distillation defence (Adv) (Papernot
et al., 2016). It can be observed that as ε∞ decreases the
BOBYQA based method achieves a higher SR than other
methods. Similarly, the success rate of BOBYQA is less
affected by adversarial training. In particular, with the infin-
ity norm of the perturbation limited to ε∞ = .02 BOBYQA
achieves a SR 1.15 and 1.59 folds better than SQUARE
when considering Norm and Adv respectively. Here the
number of network queries were restricted to 3,000, for
further details see Fig. 9.
The Zeroth-Order-Optimization (ZOO) (Chen et al., 2017)
introduced DFO methods for computing adversarial exam-
ples in the black-box setting, specifically using a coordinate
descent optimization algorithm. At the time this was a sub-
stantial departure from methods for the black-box setting
which train a proxy NN and then employ gradient based
methods for white-box attacks on the proxy network (Pa-
pernot et al., 2017; Tu et al., 2019); such methods are espe-
cially effective when numerous adversarial examples will be
computed, but require substantially more network queries
than the methods designed for misclassifying individual
examples. Following the introduction of ZOO, there have
been numerous improvements using other model-free DFO
based approaches, see (Alzantot et al., 2019; Moon et al.,
2019; Andriushchenko et al., 2019). Specifically, GenAt-
tack (Alzantot et al., 2019) is a genetic algorithm, COMBI
(Moon et al., 2019) is a direct-search method that explores
the vertices of the perturbation energy, and SQUARE (An-
driushchenko et al., 2019) is a randomized direct-search
method.
In this manuscript we consider an alternative model-based
DFO method based on BOBYQA (Powell, 2009) which ex-
plicitly develops models that approximate the loss function
in the optimisation problem and minimises the models us-
ing methods from continuous optimisation. By considering
adversarial perturbations to three NNs trained on different
datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet), we show that
for the model-free methods (Alzantot et al., 2019; Moon
et al., 2019; Andriushchenko et al., 2019) the number of
evaluation of the NN grows more rapidly as the maximum
perturbation energy decreases than does the method built
upon BOBYQA. As a consequence GenAttack, COMBI and
SQUARE are preferable for large values of the maximum
perturbation energy and BOBYQA for smaller values. As an
example Figure 1 illustrates how the BOBYQA based algo-
rithm compares to GenAttack, COMBI, and SQUARE when
considering a net either normally or adversarially trained on
CIFAR10 with different maximum perturbation energies.
We observe the intuitive principle that direct-search meth-
ods are effective to misclassify NNs with high perturbation
energies, while in more challenging settings it is preferable
to use more sophisticated model-based methods, like ours.
Model-based approaches will further challenge defences to
adversarial missclassification (Dhillon et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2019), and in so doing will lead to improved defences
and more robust networks. Model-based DFO is a well
developed area, and we expect further improvements are
possible through a more extensive investigation of these
approaches.
2. Adversarial Examples Formulated as an
Optimisation Problem
Consider a classification operator F : X → C from input
space X to output space C of classes. A targeted adversarial
perturbation η to an input X ∈ X has the property that it
changes the classification to a specified target class t, i.e
F (X) = c and F (X + η) = t 6= c. Herein we follow the
formulation by (Alzantot et al., 2019). Given: an image X,
a maximum energy budget ε∞, and a suitable loss function
L, then the task of computing the adversarial perturbation η
can be cast as an optimisation problem such as
min
η
L(X,η) s.t. ‖η‖∞ ≤ ε∞ (1)
[X + η]j ≥ l; [X + η]j ≤ u ∀j ∈ 1, . . . , n,
where the final two inequality constraints are due to
the input entries being restricted to [l, u]n. Denot-
ing the pre-classification output vector by f(X), i.e.
F (X) = arg max f(X), then the misclassification of X to
target label t is achieved by η if f(X+η)t ≥ maxj 6=t f(X+
η)j . In (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Alzantot
et al., 2019) they determined
L(X,η) = log (Σj 6=tf(X + η)j)− log (f(X + η)t) , (2)
to be the most effective loss function for computing η in (1),
and we also employ this choice throughout our experiments.
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3. Derivative Free Optimisation for
Adversarial Examples
Derivative Free Optimisation is a well developed field with
numerous types of algorithms, see (Conn et al., 2009) and
(Larson et al., 2019) for reviews on DFO principles and
algorithms. Examples of classes of such methods include:
direct search methods such as simplex, model-based meth-
ods, hybrid methods such as finite differences or implicit
filtering, as well as randomized variants of the aforemen-
tioned and methods specific to convex or noisy objectives.
The optimization formulation in Section 2 is amenable to
virtually all DFO methods, making it unclear which of the
algorithms to employ. Methods which have been trialled
include: the finite difference based ZOO attack (Chen et al.,
2017), a combinatorial direct search of the perturbation
`∞ energy constraint method COMBI (Moon et al., 2019),
a genetic direct search method GenAttack (Alzantot et al.,
2019), and most recently a randomized direct-search method
(Andriushchenko et al., 2019). Notably missing from the
aforementioned list are model-based methods.
Given a set of q samples Y = {y1, ..., yq} with yi ∈ Rn,
model-based DFO methods start by identifying the min-
imiser of the objective among the samples at iteration k,
xk = arg miny∈Y L(y). Following this, a model for the ob-
jective function L is constructed, typically centred around
the minimizer. In its simplest form one uses a polynomial
approximation to the objective, such as a quadratic model
centred in xk
m(xk + p) = a+ c>p +
1
2
p>Mp, (3)
with a ∈ R, c, p ∈ Rn, and M ∈ Rn×n being also sym-
metric. In a white-box setting one would set c = ∇L(xk)
and M = ∇2L(xk), but this is not feasible in the black-box
setting as we do not have access to the derivatives of the
objective function. Thus c and M are usually defined by
imposing interpolation conditions
mk(yi) = L(yi) for i = 1, 2, ..., q, (4)
and when q < 1 + n+ n(n+ 1)/2 (i.e. the system of equa-
tions is under-determined) other conditions are introduced
according to which algorithm is considered. The objective
model (3) is considered to be a good estimate of the objec-
tive in a neighbourhood referred to as a trust region. Once
the model mk is generated, the update step p is computed
by solving the trust region problem
min
p
mk(xk + p), subject to ‖p‖ ≤ ∆, (5)
where ∆ is the radius of the region where we believe the
model to be accurate, for more details see (Nocedal &
Wright, 2006). The new point xk + p is added to Y and a
prior point is potentially removed. Herein we consider an
exemplary1 model-based method called BOBYQA.
BOBYQA The BOBYQA algorithm, introduced in (Pow-
ell, 2009), updates the parameters of the model a, c, and M,
in each iteration in such a way as to minimise the change
in the quadratic term Mk between iterates while otherwise
fitting the sample values:
min
ak,ck,Mk
‖Mk −Mk−1‖2F (6)
s.t. mk(yi) = L(yi), i = 1, 2, . . . , q, (7)
with n+ 1 < q < 1 +n+n(n+ 1)/2 and Mk initialised as
the zero matrix. When the number of parameters q = n+ 1
then the model is considered as linear with Mk set as zero.
We further allow only κ queries at each implementation of
BOBYQA, since after the model is generated few iterations
are needed to find the minimum.
3.1. Computational Scalability and Efficiency
For improved computational scalability and efficiency, we
do not solve (1) for η ∈ Rn directly, but instead use do-
main sub-sampling and hierarchical liftings: domain sub-
sampling iteratively sweeps over batches of b<<n variables,
see (8), while hierarchical liftings clusters and perturbs vari-
ables simultaneously, see (12).
Domain Sub-Sampling The simplest version of domain
sub-sampling consists of partitioning input dimension n into
smaller disjoint domains; for example, k = bn/bc domains
Ωj of size b  n which are disjoint and which cover all
of [n]. Rather than solving (1) for η ∈ Rn directly, for
each of j = 1, . . . , k one sequentially solves for ηj ∈ Rn
which are only non-zero for entries in Ωj . The resulting
sub-domain perturbations ηj are then summed to generate
the full perturbation η =
∑k
j=1 η
j , see Figure 2 as an
example. That is, the optimisation problem (1) is adapted to
repeatedly looping over j = 1, . . . , k:
min
ηj
L
X +∑
h 6=j
η`,ηj
 s.t. ∥∥∥∥∥
k∑
h=1
ηh
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ε∞ (8)
[
X +
k∑
h=1
ηh
]
r
≥ l;
[
X +
k∑
h=1
ηh
]
r
≤ u ∀r ∈ Ωj
where the Ωj may be reinitialised; in particular following
each loop over Rn which occurs at j = k.
We considered three possible ways of selecting the domains
1BOBYQA was selected among the numerous types of model-
based DFO algorithms due to its efficiency observed for other
similar problems requiring few model samples as in climate mod-
elling (Tett et al., 2013)
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Figure 2: Example of how the perturbation η evolves
through the iterations when an image inR4×4 is attacked. In
(a) the perturbation is η = η0 and we select a sub-domain
of b = 4 pixels (in red). Once we have found the optimal
perturbation η1 in the selected sub-domain, we update the
perturbation in (b) and select a new sub-domain of dimen-
sion b. The same is repeated in (c).
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of successfully
perturbed images as a function of number of queries to a
NN trained on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. In each
image the effectiveness of different sub-sampling methods
in generating a successful adversarial example is shown for
different values of perturbation energies ε∞. See Section 4.2
for details about experimental setup and NN architectures.
• In Random Sampling we consider at each iteration a
different random sub-samplings of the domain, Ω1.
• In Ordered Sampling we generate a random disjoint
partitioning of the domain. Once each variable has
been optimised over once a new partitioning is gener-
ated.
• In Variance Sampling we choose Ωj to select in de-
creasing order of local variance of X , the variance in
intensity among the 8 neighbouring variables (e.g. pix-
els) in the same colour channel. We further reinitialise
Ωj after each loop through j = 1, . . . , k.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Queries
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
L
With Lifting
No Lifting
Figure 4: Impact of hierarchical lifting approach on Loss
function (2) as a function of the number of queries to
Inception-v3 net trained on ImageNet dataset to find the
adversarial example for a single image. The green vertical
lines correspond to changes of hierarchical level, which en-
tail an increase in the dimension of the optimisation space.
In Figure 3 we compare how these different sub-sampling
techniques perform when generating adversarial example
for the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. It can be observed
that variance sampling consistently performs better than
random and ordered sampling. This suggest that pixels
belonging to high-contrast regions are more influential than
the ones in a low-contrast one, and hence variance sampling
is the preferable ordering.
Hierarchical Lifting When the domain is very high di-
mensional, working on single pixels is not efficient as the
above described method would imply modifying only a very
small proportion of the image; for instance, we will choose
b = 50 even when n is almost three-hundred-thousand.
Thus to perturb wider portions of the image, we consider a
hierarchy of liftings as in the ZOO attack presented in (Chen
et al., 2017). We seek an adversarial example by optimising
over increasingly higher dimensional spaces at each step
referred here as level ` lifted to the image space. As an
illustration, Figure 4 shows that hierarchical lifting has a
significant impact on the minimisation of the loss function.
At each level ` we consider a linear lifting D` : Rm` → Rn
and find a level perturbation ηˆ` ∈ Rm` which is added to
the full perturbation η, according to
η =
∑`
j=0
ηj =
∑`
j=0
Dj ηˆj , (9)
where η0 is initialised as 0 and the level perturbations ηj
of the previous layers are considered as fixed. Moreover,
we impose that at each level, the grid has to double in
refinement, i.e. m`+1 = 4m`. An example of how this
works is illustrated in Figure 5.
When generating our adversarial examples, we considered
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Figure 5: Example of how the perturbation η is generated in
a hierarchical lifting method with m1 = 4 and m2 = 16 on
an image ∈ R12×12. In (a) the perturbation is η = η0 and
we highlight in red the boxes generated via the grid of di-
mension m1. Once we have found the optimal perturbation
η1, we update the perturbation in (b) and further divide the
image with a grid with m2 blocks. Once an optimal solution
is found for this grid, the final solution is shown in (c).
two kind of liftings. The first kind of liftings is based on
interpolation operations; a sorting matrix S` : Rm` → Rn
is applied such that every index of ηˆ` is uniquely associated
to a node of a coarse grid masked over the original image.
Afterwards, an interpolation L` : Rn → Rn is implemented
over the values in the coarse grid, i.e. η` = L`S`ηˆ` = D`ηˆ`.
The second kind of liftings, instead, forces the perturbation
to be high-frequency since there is several literature on
these perturbations being the most effective (Guo et al.,
2018; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019).
Some preliminary results lead us to consider the “Block”
lifting which considers a piecewise constant interpolation
and corresponds to the one also used in (Moon et al., 2019).
Alternative piecewise linear or randomised orderings were
also tried, but found not to be appreciably better to justify the
added complexity. As we show for the example in Figure 6,
this interpolation lifting divides an image in disjoint blocks
via a coarse grid and associates to each of the blocks the
same value of a parameter in ηˆ`. We characterise the lifting
D` with the following conditions∑
j
D`i,j = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (10)∑
i
D`i,j = n/m ∀j ∈ {1, ...,m}. (11)
Since m` may still be very high (usually md = n), for
each level ` we apply domain sub-sampling and consider
ηˆ` =
∑k
j=0 ηˆ
j
` . We order the blocks according to the vari-
ance of mean intensity among neighbouring blocks, in con-
trast to the variance within each block which was suggested
in (Chen et al., 2017). Consequently, at each level the ad-
versarial example is found by solving the following iterative
η = LSηˆ ∈ Rnηˆ ∈ Rm Sηˆ ∈ Rn
Figure 6: In the “Block” lifting the perturbation η is first
applier to a sorting matrix S to which an interpolation L is
implemented. Thus each block is associated uniquely to one
of the variables in ηˆ.
problem
min
η˜j`
L
(
X + η˜,D`Ωkη˜j`
)
s.t.
∥∥∥η˜ + D`Ωkη˜j`∥∥∥∞ ≤ ε∞
(12)[
X + η˜ + D`Ωkη˜j`
]
r
≥ l ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n}[
X + η˜ + D`Ωkη˜j`
]
r
≤ u ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n},
where η˜ =
∑`−1
i=0 ηi + D
`∑
m 6=j ηˆ
m
` .
In its simplest formulation, hierarchical lifting struggles
with the pixel-wise interval constraint, X + η ∈ [l, u]n. To
address this we allow the entries in η˜ to exceed the interval
and then reproject the pixel-wise entries into the interval.
3.2. Algorithm pseudo-code
Our BOBYQA based algorithm is summarised in Algorithm
1; note that not using the hierarchical method corresponds to
having one level with m = n. A Python implementation of
the proposed algorithm based on BOBYQA package from
(Cartis et al., 2019) is available on Github2.
4. Comparison of Derivative Free Methods
We compare the performance of our BOBYQA based algo-
rithm to GenAttack (Alzantot et al., 2019), combinatorial
attacks COMBI (Moon et al., 2019) and SQUARE (An-
driushchenko et al., 2019). The performance is measured
by considering the distribution of queries needed to success-
fully find adversaries to different networks trained on three
standard datasets: MNIST (Lecun et al., 1998), CIFAR10
(Krizhevsky, 2009), and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009).
4.1. Parameter Setup for Algorithms
Our experiments rely for GenAttack (Alzantot et al.,
2019), COMBI (Moon et al., 2019), and SQUARE (An-
2https://github.com/giughi/A-Model-Based-
Derivative-Free-Approach-to-Black-Box
-Adversarial-Examples-BOBYQA
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Algorithm 1 BOBYQA Based Algorithm
1: Input: Image X ∈ Rn, target label t, maximum per-
turbation ε∞, Neural Net F , initial hierarchical level
dimensionsm1, maximum number of evaluations nmax,
batch sampling size b, and maximum number κ of
queries that we are allowed to do for each batch.
2: Initialise η ← 0 ∈ Rn, neval = 0, ` = 1.
3: while arg maxF (X + η) 6= t and neval < nmax do
4: Compute the number of sub samplings necessary to
cover the whole domain numsub = n/m
5: Generate the lifting matrix D`
6: for j = 1, . . . , numsub do
7: Compute the matrixΩi which selects b dimensions
of the m-dimensional domain.
8: Define the bounds for a perturbation over the se-
lected pixels of X + η.
9: Find ηˆj` by implementing the BOBYQA optimisa-
tion to the problem (12).
10: Update the noise η+ = D`ηˆj` .
11: neval += κ, `+ = 1, m∗ = 4.
12: end for
13: end while
14: if arg maxF (X + η) = t then
15: The perturbation is successful.
16: else if neval > nmax then
17: The perturbation was not successful with nmax itera-
tions.
18: end if
driushchenko et al., 2019) on publicly available implemen-
tations3 with same hyperparameter setting and hierarchical
approach as suggested by the respective authors.
For the proposed algorithm based on BOBYQA, we tuned
three main parameters: the dimension of the initial set q, the
batch dimension b, and the trust region radius.
Batch Dimension Figure 7 shows the loss value averaged
over 20 images for attacks to NNs trained on CIFAR10,
and ImageNet datsets when different batch dimensions
are chosen. The average objective loss as a function
of network queries is largely insensitive to the batch
sizes, but with modest differences for the larger Ima-
geNet data set where b = 25 was observed to require
modestly fewer queries. For the remained of the sim-
ulations we use b = 50 as a good trade-off between
faster model generation and good performances.
3GenAttack: https://github.com/nesl/
adversarial_genattack
COMBI: https://github.com/snu-mllab/
parsimonious-blackbox-attack
SQUARE: https://github.com/max-andr/
square-attack
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Figure 7: Comparison in loss function according to the
different batch dimensions b and the different dataset. After
the linear model is generated, the optimisation algorithm is
always allowed to query the net 5 times if b = 25 or b = 50,
or 10 times if b = 100. For ImageNet we are using the
hierarchical lifting approach.
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Figure 8: Comparison on how the loss L decreases when
the initial set dimension is either q = b + 1 or q = 2b + 1
in an attack to an image of MNIST with ε = 0.3. We chose
for both the methods b = 50 and a maximum of 30 function
evaluations after the model was initialised, i.e. κ = q + 30.
Initial Set Dimension Once a subdomain of dimension b
is chosen, the model (3) is initialised with a set of q
samples on which the interpolation conditions (4) are
imposed. There are two main choices for the dimension
of the set: either q = b + 1, thus computing a and
c with the interpolation and leaving M always null
and thus having a linear model, or q = 2 ∗ b + 1
which allows us to initialise a, c, and the diagonal of
M, hence obtaining a quadratic model. The results
in Figure 8 show that at each iteration of the domain
sub-sampling the quadratic method performs as well
as a linear method, however it requires more queries to
initialise the model. Thus we consider the linear model
with q = b+ 14.
Trust Region Radius Once the model for the optimisation
is built, the step of the optimisation is bounded by the
4The Constraint Optimisation by Linear Approximation
(COBYLA), a linear based model DFO algorithm, was introduced
before BOBYQA (Powell, 2007); however, COBYLA considers
different constraints on the norm of the variable. Because of this
and the possibility to extend the method to quadratic models, we
name our algorithm after BOBYQA.
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Figure 9: Cumulative fraction of test set images successfully misclassified with adversarial examples generated by GenAttack,
COMBI, SQUARE and our BOBYQA based approach for different perturbation energies ε∞ and NNs trained on MNIST,
CIFAR10 and ImageNet dataset. In all results the solid and dashed lines denoted by ‘Norm’ and ‘Adv’ corresponds to
attacks on nets trained without or with a defence strategy respectively. For MNIST and CIFAR we consider the distillation
defence method from (Papernot et al., 2016) while for ImageNet the adversarial training proposed in (Kurakin et al., 2016).
trust region radius. We have selected the beginning
radius to be one third of the whole space in which the
perturbation lies. With this choice of radius we usually
reach within 5 steps a corner of the boundary, and the
further iterates remain effectively stationary.
For the hierarchical lifting approach we consider an initial
sub-domain of dimension m1 = 4 × 4 × 3, as this is the
biggest grid that we can optimise over with a batch b = 50.
After considering m7 = 256 × 256 × 3, we make use of
m8 = 299× 299× 3 and do not consider further levels.
4.2. Dataset and Neural Network Specifications
Experiments on each dataset are performed with one of the
best performing NN architectures as described below
MNIST/CIFAR10 MNIST and CIFAR10 are two data-
sets with images divided between 10 classes and of dimen-
sion 28x28x1 and 32x32x3 respectively. On them we apply
the net introduced in (Chen et al., 2017) which is structured
in succession by: 2 Conv layers with ReLu activation fol-
lowed by a maxpooling layer. This process is repeated twice
and then two dense layers with Relu activation are applied.
Finally a softmax layer generates the output vector. For
each dataset, we train the same architecture in two different
ways obtaining separate nets. One is obtained by optimising
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the accuracy of the net on raw unperturbed images, while
the other is trained with the application of the distillation
defence by (Papernot et al., 2016).
To generate a comprehensive distribution for the queries
at each energy budget, for both the two trained nets and
10 images per class, we attempt to misclassify an image
targeting all of the 9 remaining classes; this way we generate
a total of 900 perturbations per energy budget. For these
two datasets the images are of relative low dimension and
we do not apply the hierarchical approach.
ImageNet This is a data-set of millions of images with
a dimension of 299x299x3 divided between 1000 classes.
For this data-set we consider the Inception-v3 net (Szegedy
et al., 2016) trained with and without the adversarial defence
proposed in (Kurakin et al., 2016)5. Due to the large number
of target classes in ImageNet, we perform tests on random
images and target classes. The number of tests conducted
for Inception-v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) and the adversarially
trained variant (Kurakin et al., 2016) are: 303 and 120 for
∞ = 0.05, 155 and 114 for ∞ = 0.02 and 149 and 116
for ∞ = 0.01 respectively.
4.3. Experimental Results
In Figure 9 we present the cumulative fraction of images
misclassified (abridged by CDF for cumulative distribution
function) as a function of the number of queries to the NN
for different perturbation energies ε∞. The pixels are nor-
malised to be in the interval (−1/2, 1/2), hence, ε∞ = 0.1
would imply that any pixel is allowed to change 10% of the
total intensity range from its initial value. By illustrating the
CDFs we easily see which method has been able to misclas-
sify the largest fraction of images in the given test-set for a
fixed number of queries to the NN. It can be observed that
the proposed BOBYQA based approach achieves state-of-
the-art results when the perturbation bound of η decreases.
This behaviour is consistent across all of the considered
datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet); however, the
energy at which the BOBYQA algorithm performs the best,
varies in each case.
In the experiments we also considered nets trained with
defence methods, distillation (Papernot et al., 2016) for
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets while adversarial training
(Kurakin et al., 2016) for ImageNet, and the results can be
identified in Figure 9 by the dashed lines. Similar to the pre-
vious case, we observe that the proposed BOBYQA based
5For the non-adversarially trained net we considered
the one available at http://jaina.cs.ucdavis.
edu/datasets/adv/imagenet/inception_
v3_2016_08_28_frozen.tar.gz, while for the
weights of the adversarially trained net we relied on
https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/
master/research/adv_imagenet_models.
algorithm performs the best when the energy perturbation
decreases. Moreover, the BOBYQA based algorithm seems
to be the least affected in its performance when the any de-
fence is used; for example, at ∞ =0.01 and 15,000 queries,
the defence reduces the CDF of COMBI by 0.078 compared
to 0.051 for BOBYQA. This further supports the idea that
for more challenging scenarios model-based approaches are
preferable as compared to model-free counterparts.
We associate the counter-intuitive improvement of the CDF
in the MNIST and ImageNet with high perturbation ener-
gies cases to the distillation and the adversarial training
being focused primarily on low energy perturbations. For
ImageNet, non-model-based algorithms use different hier-
archical approaches which we expect leads in part to the
superior performance of COMBI in Fig. 9 panels (g)-(i).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We have introduced BOBYQA, a method to search adver-
sarial examples based on a model-based DFO algorithm and
have conducted some experiments to understand how it com-
pares to existing GenAttack (Alzantot et al., 2019), COMBI
(Moon et al., 2019), and SQUARE (Andriushchenko et al.,
2019) attack, when targeted black-box adversarial examples
are searched with the fewest queries to a neural net.
Following the results of the experiments that we presented
above, the method with which generating the adversarial
example should be chosen according to which setting the
adversary is considering. When the perturbation energy is
high, one should choose either COMBI if the input is high-
dimensional or SQUARE if the input is low-dimensional.
On the other hand, a model-based approach like BOBYQA
should be considered as soon as the complexity of the setting
increases, e.g. the maximum perturbation energy is reduced
or the net is adversarially trained.
With the BOBYQA attack algorithm we have introduced a
different approach for the generation of targeted adversarial
examples in a black-box setting with the aim of exploring
what advantages are achieved by considering model-based
DFO algorithms. We did not focus on presenting an al-
gorithm which is in absolute the most efficient; primarily
because our algorithm has several aspects in which to be
improved. The BOBYQA attack is limited by the imple-
mentation of py-BOBYQA (Cartis et al., 2019) since the
element-wise constraints do not allow the consideration of
more sophisticated liftings which leverage on compressed
sensing, to name one of the many possible variations.
In conclusion, the results in this paper support how sophisti-
cated misclassification methods are preferable in challeng-
ing settings. As a consequence, variations on our model-
based algorithms should be considered in the future as a tool
to establish the effectiveness of newly presented adversarial
A Model-Based Derivative-Free Approach to Black-Box Adversarial Examples: BOBYQA
defence techniques.
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